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PANEL I
THE USE OF INTERIM MEASURES BY THE COMMITTEE AGAINST
TORTURE: TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE INSTRUMENT FOR THE
PROTECTION OF VICTIMS AND WITNESSES IN TORTURE CASES
Opening Remarks from Hélène Legeay, Moderator*

G

ood morning, everyone. I am the Middle East and North
Africa Programme Manager at Action by Christians
for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT). ACAT is a French
NGO based in Paris. Our main mandate is to fight against torture,
the death penalty, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. To
present our work in a few words, we provide training for lawyers.
I have provided training for lawyers in Tunisia and soon, I hope,
in Morocco as well. This training concerns how to document
torture cases and how to file complaints before international
enforcement bodies. ACAT released an annual report on the phenomenon of torture around the world and we also release some
country reports on a regular basis.
Among the means for assisting victims, ACAT has filed
several petitions before international bodies, mainly before the
Committee against Torture (CAT, Committee). For example,
Gerald [Staberock] was talking about the petition concerning
a man who was detained in Morocco and was supposed to be
extradited to Algeria. ACAT filed this complaint and won.1 It was
the first complaint against Morocco since Morocco recognized
the competence of the CAT to take individual communications
in 2006. So, it was the first complaint and we won the case before
CAT and Morocco complied with the decision. This was really
good news. Also, participating in the first hearing before CAT
was my colleague in the Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan case.2 It was
the first pleading in CAT and it was successful. I hope we will be
able to develop that kind of procedure.

bodies to preserve the rights of the parties to a case and to avoid
the occurrence of an irreparable harm.3 An order of interim
measures may require that the states take positive actions—like
providing protection to the victim or access to a doctor—or to
refrain from taking action by delaying an execution or an extradition until the case has been resolved by the international body.
In torture cases, interim measures appear to be as important
or sometimes more important than the consideration of the merits of the case. The interim measures’ aim is to prevent torture in
individual cases, to shield potential victims from these actions. In
that sense, interim measures are—for the moment—the best tool at
the disposal of international bodies to compel states to respect the
main purpose of the conventions preventing torture. Reparations,
rehabilitation of the victims, and prosecution of torture crimes are
important issues that we will also address today. But, we all agree
on the idea that the prevention of torture is what we want to achieve.

I’m really glad to attend this conference and I’m sure it will
give even more ideas on what we can do to collaborate together—
NGOs, researchers, and also CAT—to better assist the victims
and get protection and reparations for them. Before introducing
the first panel, I want to thank the Washington College of Law
and OMCT (World Organisation Against Torture) for organizing
this conference and for inviting me to moderate this panel, which
is important for me and for ACAT as we have tried—sometimes
successfully, sometimes not—to protect victims by asking CAT
for interim measures orders.

As protective measures, interim measures are valuable tools
as long as they are, first, adapted to the situation—to the threat—
and, second, as long as they are efficient.

Interim measures—or what are called provisional or precautionary measures—are ordered by international human rights

Although previously considered as merely recommendations
by international bodies and their member states, interim measures
have progressively gained binding authority, not only through

* Hélène Legeay is the Middle East and North Africa Programme
Manager at Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT).
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landmark jurisprudence, but also the International Court of Justice
paved the way with its reasoning in the LaGrand case in 2001,4 and
it has since been followed by other international or regional bodies.

As we can see, the good faith of states is still the basis for the
efficiency of interim measures, like it is for the efficiency of the
decisions of international enforcement bodies in general. In the
last year, we have seen positive developments in international
jurisprudence regarding the diversity of the interim measures
ordered to protect the litigants. NGOs like REDRESS, ACAT,
or OMCT assisting victims have widely contributed to these
developments. The [Inter-American] Court of Human Rights
has been at the forefront on the issue and a source of inspiration for other international enforcement bodies. But, as Carla
Ferstman will certainly explain more deeply in her presentation, much more could or should be done to provide the best
protection to victims, or potential victims of torture, through
interim measures.

Despite this encouraging evolution of the international jurisprudence, the legal status of interim measures is still uncertain.
As Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón will address in his presentation,
some states have proven quite willing to respect interim measures, but still, in too many cases, we have seen states breaching
orders and consequently, victims suffering irreparable harm.
Some of them have been executed, some have been extradited to
a country where they have been ill-treated or tortured, and some
have been threatened, attacked, or even killed in that country
because of petitions that failed in front of an international body.

Remarks of Carla Ferstman*
Introduction

T

oday is extremely important, not only because it will
explain and explore the importance of the UN Committee
against Torture in the overall fight against impunity for
torture. But also, it will touch on some very practical measures
and hopefully this will help all of us in our respective areas of
work to improve the situation of survivors of torture and those
who face a risk of torture in their dealings with these types
of bodies.
At REDRESS,5 which is an organization based in the United
Kingdom, we work with survivors of torture in all parts of the
world and have taken cases before most regional human rights
courts as well as many treaty bodies. When it comes to working
with survivors of torture and considering what motivates them
to bring a case before a regional or international human rights
body, first and foremost what they are seeking is some form
of acknowledgement of the harm suffered by an independent
and impartial body that can draw attention to what they have
experienced. Justice is not only, or not mostly, about any kind
of revenge against a particular perpetrator or a state. It is really
about trying to restore what the victim has lost, which is their
dignity through the absence of rights in the context of torture.

This is in a way the overlaying issue for many torture survivors
that we need to consider.
Victims invariably face a range of problems when filing claims
before international bodies. Certainly they face these problems
when they file claims at the domestic level as well. Therefore,
we should keep that in perspective. They face threats of physical
violence to them and their families; sometimes these threats are
carried out. They face further risk of detention; they face new or
false claims or civil proceedings brought against them as some
kind of punishment. Victims are sometimes forced to withdraw
their claims as a result of pressure or extortion that they face.

When it comes to the issue of protection, one of the biggest
challenges for a torture survivor who is undertaking efforts to
try to obtain some measure of justice, first at the domestic level
and, if that fails, eventually at the international level, is risk of
reprisals after already suffering from torture. We can understand
why it is so important that the bodies, which are supposed to be
there to provide a measure of redress, do not contribute to the
problem and end up being a place that, by virtue of the victim
seeking some kind of justice, creates a new risk of a reprisal.

In 2007, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe made a very important statement in relation to the
practice of forcing victims to withdraw their complaints in
mostly, but not exclusively, applicants from the North Caucasus

* Carla Ferstman is the Director of REDRESS (www.redress.org).
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So, it is quite important to situate the challenge of victim
protection in human rights cases with regard to the situation
that operates in most countries around the world. To the extent
that protection mechanisms exist at the domestic level, they are
not geared to human rights litigants. This is an overall problem.
When we start to talk about interim measures, if a regional
human rights court or a treaty mechanism is recommending that
states take particular action, one must be mindful of the types of
systems that exist at the domestic level. How will the state respond to these interim measures, when it has very limited structures in place? This is an overall concern of which we should be
mindful in considering the challenge of protection.

region of the Russian Federation, as well as from Moldova,
Azerbaijan, and—albeit less recently—Turkey.6 This resolution
importantly indicated that the European Court of Human Rights
should continue with cases where there had been some indication that the withdrawal by the victim had been requested under
spurious grounds. So, it is quite interesting that all regional
courts have faced this issue and it is not only an issue that has
been faced by the UN Committee against Torture or the Human
Rights Committee.
There have been, very importantly, reprisals against human
rights defenders and lawyers representing victims in claims
before international bodies, as well as claims at the domestic
level. So, all of these problems or challenges combine to make
the prospect of seeking justice a risky business for victims
of torture, which is very unfortunate.

Taking one step back, is there an obligation to protect? Is there
a human rights obligation that states have to protect? The short
answer is, of course, yes. But actually, when one looks through
the wide variety of human rights treaties, one can see a distinct
absence of the obligation set out in most typical treaties relating
to human rights. The reason for that is typically, when we think
about protection in the context of criminal trials, the victim is
not normally or has not traditionally been seen as a party to proceedings. When we look at the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,8 which has an extensive section on fair trial
rights, there is no mention of the obligation to protect victims
and witnesses. So, it is quite a stark absence in the overall system
of human rights protection.

The Challenge of Protection of Victims
in International and Domestic Courts
Many of my comments will be based, at least in part, on a
study that REDRESS conducted several years ago on the overall challenge of protection of victims.7 Part of the reason why
we undertook this research was as a result of our work on the
International Criminal Court and international criminal tribunals, where as many of you know there is quite an extensive practice on the protection of witnesses in the context of
those tribunals, with the system at the International Criminal
Court differing from the system in place at the ad hoc tribunals—the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
and for the Former Yugoslavia. Unlike the ad hoc tribunals,
where victims are only able to appear as witnesses, at the
ICC, in addition to their role as witnesses, victims have an
independent role where they can present information directly
and participate in proceedings. However, the structures of
protection at the ICC were modeled on the ad hoc tribunals
and the ICC was therefore not adequately equipped to deal
with victims who were acting on their own initiative. The
ICC adopted a prosecution-initiated model where witness
protection measures were accorded in relation to the importance of the particular witness to the criminal prosecution.

Important Protections in the CAT
Luckily though, when it comes to the United Nations Convention against Torture, we do have Article 13, which sets out in no
uncertain terms the obligation of states to ensure that victims who
are seeking justice do not face reprisals.9 This is a very important
provision. Similarly, in the torture field, the Istanbul Protocol,10
which deals with the medical and legal documentation of torture,
clearly specifies that there is an obligation to protect victims and
witnesses. But probably the most significant and extensive provision on protection is in the new International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances,11
which sets out state obligations in very clear terms.
In accordance with the recent General Comment issued
by the UN Committee against Torture on Article 14,12 which
concerns the right to redress and rehabilitation, States Parties
should also take measures to prevent interference with victims’
privacy and to protect victims, their families, witnesses, and others who have intervened on their behalf against intimidation and
retaliation at all times before, during, and after judicial, administrative, or other proceedings that affect the interest of victims.
Failure to provide protection to victims stands in the way of
victims filing complaints and thereby violates the right to seek
and obtain redress and remedy. Here, the UN Committee against
Torture underscores the relationship between the need to protect
and other rights set out in the Convention, so the obligation to
protect is not only a self-standing obligation—victims need to
be protected—but when there has been a failure to protect, this

The reason why I say this is because it is quite similar at the
domestic level around the world. Victim and witness protection
systems are typically established to deal with organized crime or
serious crime cases and are managed by the prosecution service.
So, when we think about the victim of a human rights abuse, who
is seeking some kind of justice independent from any criminal
prosecution that an office of the prosecutor might bring, there
are a number of very specific challenges that the victim would
face: first, in convincing the relevant bodies that the individual
is entitled to protection when there is no criminal case; and second, the typical bodies undertaking the protection are the police,
sometimes the military, depending on the kind of case, which
are in the context of human rights, often the same bodies that
are allegedly responsible for the violations.
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impacts a variety of other rights enshrined in the Convention,
including the obligation to afford a remedy.

it in terms of harm to the case? Because certainly one of the
roles of interim measures is to safeguard the situation so that the
litigation can proceed. So, in terms of how we look at the issue of
irreparable harm, does the fact that a victim has been threatened,
which may force her to withdraw a particular case, amount to
sufficient harm although not physical harm?

What are the types of measures that states have at the domestic
level? As I have already indicated in my introduction, most states
that do have protection legislation, as well as protection structures, have developed these systems in the context of criminal
law and particularly organized crime. At the international level,
the UN Office on Drugs and Crime has spearheaded efforts to
encourage states around the world to revise their laws and practices to protect victims and witnesses mainly in the context of
organized crime. So, at the international level, there has been
some movement to encourage states around the world to adopt
protection legislation and establish protection units. However,
this initiative of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime has focused
on the criminal model. Therefore, it is not sufficient or adequate
to respond to the needs of protection in a human rights case,
with respect to human rights litigants. Moreover, as I previously
mentioned, there are a whole range of protective measures within
the international criminal realm, both during the trial proceedings as well as measures on the ground to protect victims and
witnesses. However for the most part, these too are focused on a
prosecution model.

Another question is whether interim measures are able to
address threats against lawyers and human rights defenders, in
addition to the direct victim. In principle, one would think that
they should be, though the relevant provisions and regulations
are not actually so clear. If we read rule 114 of the UN Committee against Torture’s regulations, the first paragraph: “At any
time after the receipt of a complaint, the Committee, a working group, or the Rapporteur(s) on new complaints and interim
measures may transmit to the State [P]arty concerned, for its
urgent consideration, a request that it take such interim measures
as the Committee considers necessary to avoid irreparable damage to the victim or victims of alleged violations.”13 How does
one interpret that? Can we possibly say that the threats to the
lawyers are part and parcel of irreparable damage to the victim?
Certainly that would be an appropriate way in which to look at
the matter. However, that interpretation probably goes one step
beyond the plain meaning of the text.

The Use of Interim Measures

Are interim measures able to deal with reprisals after the fact?
So, let’s say the UN Committee against Torture issues a decision,
and as a result the state concerned is very angry and the individual concerned is re-tortured, possibly even killed. What can
the treaty body do in that kind of circumstance? I would suggest
that interim measures, because of what exactly they are, would
have difficulty to operate after the fact. Therefore, the question is
what else needs to be in place to ensure the continued ability of
the Committee to have oversight over the protection needs after
it has issued a decision. Certainly, as the UN Committee against
Torture has itself recognized in its recent General Comment,
there is a link between remedy and protection. So the UN Committee against Torture or any treaty body or other international
mechanism can, in light of the need to guarantee non-repetition,
set out the obligation to ensure continued protection to the victim and others concerned. This could potentially be addressed in
relation to the remedial order at the end of the case to the extent
that the Committee has continuing supervisory ability at the end
of the case, which many bodies do.

What about victims who are not criminal witnesses, when
they are bringing their own human rights cases? For me, this is
the biggest challenge that we face. With respect to this massive
gap, one of the areas which we can look at, and which I will
discuss now, is the area of interim measures. Hélène [Legeay]
has already indicated what interim measures are. Basically they
are tools to stop or postpone the execution of a decision or an
act that might prejudice the outcome of the proceedings before a
final judgment is reached. They can also be positive, requiring a
state to take particular action to forestall irreparable harm. There
are also instances where an interim measure can be a request
or an order to a state to stop negative action. One limitation of
the system of interim measures is that they are typically only
available for serious and urgent cases. So, we must consider this
in light of the variety of needs that torture survivors have with
respect to protection and whether they all fit within the context
of serious and urgent cases. Most cases fall under these criteria;
however it can often be a question of evidence, whether evidence
is strong enough to demonstrate the sufficient level of urgency
and seriousness.

Another concern is the response by the different states
to interim measures. This has to do with the overall challenge
of enforcing anything that a treaty body or even some of the
regional courts recommend or order, as the case may be. I suggest
two main issues with respect to the response to interim measures.
The first concern is limited capacity. As already indicated, one
of the most significant challenges is the limitation of domestic legislation and domestic procedures on the ground to deal
with protection concerns. So, if an order or request for interim
measures is made to a particular country where the systems and

Another question is whether interim measures are able to
provide all of the protection needs of torture victims trying to
bring a case at an international level. The first issue is how one
assesses the definition of avoiding irreparable harm. Will it necessarily be applicable to protection concerns that are perhaps not
amounting to death threats or serious bodily injury? How do we
define serious irreparable harm? Do we define it in relation to
the harm to the victim, or perhaps can we go further and define
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structures are not adequately in place, there will be a capacity
problem with respect to the ability of that state to appropriately
and effectively give effect to that order or recommendation. The
second concern is the lack of will. This is particularly problematic for the treaty bodies, whose ‘views’ or decisions are not
understood as binding, although of course the argument can be
made that the views and decisions of the treaty bodies are necessarily binding given that they are the authoritative interpretation
of the treaty, which the states have agreed to enforce.

To a certain extent, this judgment was likely influenced by the
LaGrand case, given the timing.

Conclusion
In summary, with respect to the legal basis for interim measures, we have a variety of different systems. The legal basis
will be determined either by treaty, internal rules, or it will be
determined by implication, binding on the basis of a good faith
interpretation of the relevant treaties. Bodies that issue views or
recommendations face distinct challenges in the sense that if the
overall mandate of the body is not capable of issuing binding
decisions, and therefore it is more difficult to imply a binding
nature to an interim measure. This is one of the challenges of
UN treaty bodies in trying to cultivate the argument that interim
measures are binding. Not to say that the argument cannot be
made—certainly it can and it should—but one can understand
why it can be difficult, and why certain states have not seen it
necessary to enforce interim measures.

With respect to the legal basis of interim measures, there are
several different types of frameworks. Some courts and bodies
have within their treaties the power to order interim measures.
So, for instance, the International Court of Justice, or the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights have specific provisions
in their founding documents which deal with these matters.
Others do not have such provisions in their statutes, but internal
regulations have provided their ability to order interim measures.
Here we can think of the European Court of Human Rights as an
example, which has developed rules, but they are not part of the
statute as such. And, other bodies have no provisions either in
the statute, or in regulations, however they nonetheless interpret
their mandate to allow them to order interim measures.

In conclusion, the first way to strengthen protection measures in
the context of human rights litigants’ need for protection is to make
the system of interim measures as binding as possible. Second, I
suggest that it is necessary to clarify what states are obliged to do in
order to make protection effective. Given the gaps at the domestic
level, it would be helpful for international bodies—including the
treaty mechanisms, and in particular the UN Committee against Torture—to explain in great detail what is necessary to protect human
rights litigants in the context of the Convention. This is something
which has not been done; domestic practice is inadequate, international standards are simply not sufficiently clear. While there must
be continued efforts to tackle the lack of will at the domestic level,
capacity is something that one has a greater chance of influencing.
Making those standards as clear as possible to enable implementation by domestic authorities is important.

With respect to how these different frameworks have been
understood, the International Court of Justice has come out
with an important decision, which Hélène has already mentioned, in the LaGrand case.14 The Court indicated that the
failure of the United States to implement the interim measures
that were issued by the International Court of Justice constituted a violation of the United States’ obligations. In that particular case, it was quite interesting, because the International
Court of Justice in its Statute specifically recognizes interim
measures; however, it does not go so far as to indicate that
the interim measures contained in the Statute are binding. So,
it is mentioned in the Statute; however, there is no mention
of whether they are binding or recommendatory. Nonetheless,
the International Court of Justice’s decision concluded that because of the important role of interim measures in safeguarding the sanctity of the system, those interim measures had to
be regarded as binding.

What are the positive measures of protection that human
rights bodies can insert into their interim measures? The UN
Committee against Torture and other bodies can be more descriptive in the types of measures that they set out in their interim
measures findings. And, also it would be helpful to strengthen
follow-up mechanisms, both follow-up of interim measures as
well as follow-up of decisions where protection features as part
of the decision. In addition, it may be useful for the Committee to
issue a General Comment on Article 13 of the Convention against
Torture. It could be quite interesting and it could potentially have
an important role not only in relation to the Convention against
Torture but also with respect to the clarification of applicable
standards of protection in human rights cases more broadly.

There has been progressive development in the jurisprudence
of the European Court of Human Rights. In an early case regarding an expulsion from Sweden to Chile, the European Court
indicated that the interim measures were not binding. But that
position has changed. In a more recent case regarding an extradition from Turkey to Uzbekistan, the European Court made a very
clear finding that interim measures must necessarily be binding.
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Remarks of Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón*
Introduction

I

think the topic of this panel is a fascinating discussion
overall, the theme of the conference is a very practical
perspective to sit and find some new ideas to improve the
protection mechanisms, particularly the individual complaint
mechanisms of the Convention against Torture (CAT, Convention),
and again to begin to look to different types of mechanisms that
exist around the world. In my case, I was invited to talk a bit
about the Inter-American Human Rights System. Particularly,
I would like to focus on the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR, Commission). A lot has been written
and said about the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, but
a more detailed and narrow approach exploring the powers and
practice of the Commission as a reference for discussion with
the mechanisms of the treaty bodies of the UN—particularly the
Committee against Torture—could be extremely useful and has
yet to be explored in-depth.

international level on the basis of the traditional finding of international responsibility of states.

I am going to tell you why I think it is very important
to narrow it down and to begin to look at the practice in the
Commission in the framework and architecture of the InterAmerican Human Rights System.

However, one of the key elements of human rights regimes is
the need to prevent human rights violations, which is arguably
one of the most important aspects of the object and purpose of
such regimes. This is true as a duty of states and it is true to
inform the work of international human rights bodies. This may,
for example, explain in part why the UN treaty bodies, such as
the Human Rights Committee or the Committee against Torture,
have established in the Rules of Procedure the power to adopt
interim measures.15 Such a preventive mandate requires the exercise of expansive actions to adequately respond to certain human
rights violations.

Human rights supervision is now a very well-settled practice,
general supervision—when we talk about countries, thematic
reports, general comments, and advisory services—as well
as individual complaints. In order to discharge their mandates
under the corresponding human rights treaties, these powers
have developed and evolved constantly to improve promotion
and protection of human rights in light of the object and purpose
of the pertinent treaty. On the one hand, the general supervisory
powers play a very important role in inducing states to adopt
structural changes that will prevent future violations of human
rights in the immediate term. Such general supervision is also
a very useful instrument to highlight the existence of endemic
problems in specific countries or specific issues in a region, and
in many instances empowers the work of civil society organizations and other actors on the local level.

This expansive interpretation of these committees’ own
powers has been replicated by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights. While only the Inter-American Convention
on Forced Disappearance of Persons16 explicitly refers to such
a power—interim measures—the Commission has included in
its Rules of Procedure such a provision since the 1980s.17 And
it is recognized by most states of the [Organization of American
States] as a legitimate development of its implied powers in individual cases under the American Convention on Human Rights18
and under other regional international treaties.

In the realm of individual complaints, most of the powers
of these international mechanisms have been geared toward
establishing the international responsibility of the state. This of
course usually occurs after violations have occurred, and the only
available remedies are reparations, including compensation. In
fact, this usually happens months, if not years later, after local
remedies have been exhausted. It is ex post facto action on the

This provision has evolved constantly to the current draft
recently approved by the Commission, which will enter into
force in August of this year. Hopefully I will be able to talk a
little bit about this process.

Structure of the Inter-American Commission
I will focus on some aspects of the practice of the Commission that could be interesting and useful for the discussion
about provisional measures of the Committee against Torture.

* Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón is Professorial Lecturer in Residence and
Co-Director of the Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
at American University Washington College of Law.
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However, I will not deal with the provisional measures of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as I intend to narrow the
presentation to the powers of the Commission, as an interesting
reference of quasi-adjudicatory bodies on the practice of interim
measures.

cases, all interim measures, are first processed in the Commission and subsequently could end up reaching the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. So, in order to understand the rightful
dimension of the individual complaint system in the Americas
region, we have to understand that the process of the Court is not
a different process from that of the Commission on individual
complaints. It is one system, one procedure, in which there is
a process of incremental pressure on states. And there are different moments in the processing of petitions that empower the
Commission, empower the victims, petitioners or in many cases
government officials, to do things on a national level in order to
respond to the process in the Inter-American Commission and
the Inter-American Court.

Let me now turn to explain very briefly the general framework, the general architecture of powers that inform the
Commission’s practice on the protection and promotion of
human rights. The Commission has received a very broad
mandate by the states of the Organization of American States.
The Commission has both the power to deal with general situations and deploy diplomatic and political tools to confront human
rights violations of all sorts. The Commission can use these powers to confront individual situations or more structural endemic
problems, as well as gross and systematic violations of human
rights, as it has done in the past, through several decades during
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s in Central America, in the Southern
Cone, and in the Andean region, where we saw the practice
by several states of massive violations of human rights.

In the framework of the individual complaints procedure in
the Inter-American System, we will explore the normative structure that informs the individual complaint procedure, specifically
the interim measures regime in the individual complaint procedure in the Inter-American System. The Commission primarily
grants precautionary measures to protect persons from grave and
imminent danger of injury of rights recognized under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (Declaration)20
and other regional treaties. This is the normative regime that
informs individual cases and that of course is directly relevant
to the adoption of interim measures. The Charter of the Organization of American States21 sets out the legal architecture of
the OAS and it is binding on all OAS members, including the
[United States], Canada, and all Central American, Caribbean,
and South American countries—all of the region.

One of the most notable mechanisms of the Commission is
its power to perform on-site visits, a function in place since the
inception of the Commission in the 60s. In the first decade of
existence, the Commission performed several on-site visits to
the countries of the region. As you may very well know, this is a
very intense proposition for an international supervisory body to
deploy itself into the jurisdiction of one of the supervised states,
but it has settled into a very important practice of the Commission
to confront, among others, systematic violations of human rights.

Under Article 106 of the Charter, the primary function of
the Commission is to promote the observance and protection of
human rights and to serve as a consultative organ of the OAS in
these matters. The notion of protection in this provision necessarily involves the powers to receive and adjudicate human rights
cases. Every state in the Americas has accepted the competence
of the Commission to consider the individual complaints concerning alleged human rights violations that occur in their jurisdiction just by ratifying the Charter. For those states that have
not yet ratified the American Convention, the Commission will
determine whether the state violated the rights set forth in the
American Declaration. The Commission and the Inter-American
Court have both held that the Declaration, although not initially
adopted as a legally binding instrument, is now a source of legal
obligation for OAS Member States. Additionally, by approving
the Commission’s Statute, the Member States have established
the Commission’s authority to receive and decide individual
complaints alleging violations of the Declaration against those
states that are not parties to the Convention.

Another very important set of tools with respect to this general
supervisory power of the Commission is country reporting. The
Commission has reported systematically about country situations
throughout the region and regional endemic problems. The most
important report, I believe, of the Inter-American Commission,
was the Report on Terrorism and Human Rights,19 released after
September 11, 2001. This report basically collected the Commission’s prior activities from the previous decades throughout
the region—regimes arguing that they were combating the threat
from terrorist groups and adopting measures that clearly violated
human rights law. The Commission was very quick in introducing this general report on terrorism and human rights to engage
in a dialogue with countries, many of them, including the [United
States], engaged in practices that, in my opinion, clearly violated
established international human rights law.

Individual Complaints and Interim Measures
There are other mechanisms, such as rapporteurships, interim
measures, and cases regarding torture, as well as other practices
such as press releases. But I want to now turn to the adjudicatory
dimension, which of course takes us into the realm of interim
measures. The adjudicatory dimension of the Inter-American
Commission must be understood again in this architecture by
which the Commission holds the key of access to individual
complaints in the Inter-American System. And it means that all

Furthermore, the Commission has read the Declaration as an
evolving source of law, noting that its application is consistent
with the practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Therefore, the Declaration serves as a parallel to the American
Convention for those states that have not ratified the American
Convention.
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In the Inter-American System, the purpose of precautionary
measures is to prevent irreparable harm to persons or to preserve
the subject matter of the proceedings in connection with pending
litigation. Therefore, their adoption does not require a case
pending before the Commission, nor do they have to join the
claim of a human rights violation. Although the precautionary
measures are not explicitly mentioned in the American Convention or statute, as I mentioned before, these measures have been
institutionalized for decades through Rules of Procedure of the
Commission.22 Under Article 25 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission, in serious and urgent situations the Commission
may, on its own initiative or the initiative of a party, request that
a state adopt precautionary measures.

After doing a very quick analysis of the measures, we found
that of the 771 measures adopted by the Commission from 1994
to 2012, 665 measures dealt with the right to life, along with
other rights. Six hundred thirty-four measures dealt with life and
humane treatment. Five hundred eighty-two dealt with personal
integrity, along with rights other than the right to life. Eightythree measures dealt with the right to life alone. Only seven measures dealt with humane treatment alone—not related to the right
to life or other rights under the American Convention. Therefore,
the great majority of the precautionary measures adopted by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have focused on
these non-derogable core rights established both in the Declaration and the American Convention.

If protections are provided by the state as a result of an order
issued by the Inter-American Commission, these may be due to
its own motion or at a request of a party. Taking into consideration the special circumstances existing in several states of the
Americas, the Commission has adopted precautionary measures
to protect persons on an individual and collective basis. In this
sense, beneficiaries of precautionary measures have been, among
others, human rights defenders, persons in detention—some of
whom have been sentenced to capital punishment or are being
kept in deplorable health conditions—persons being harassed in
the context of judicial procedures, persons with health problems,
children, and entire communities of indigenous peoples.

We have numbers for other rights related to, for example,
freedom of expression with 25 measures; right to health with 26
measures; equality with fifteen measures; personal safety with
thirteen measures; and liberty with eight measures. You will see
that there is a clear focus of the Commission on these particular
rights, even though the normative framework of the Commission
is very broad—not only right to life, equality, and personal integrity, but many other rights. The Commission has been very deliberate and careful in using these powers on these types of rights,
dispelling some conceptions that the Commission has been very
liberal in dispensing precautionary measures in all sorts of situations, particularly in the framework of the Belo Monte case.23

Study on the Commission’s
Use of Precautionary Measures

Another important finding that illustrates the scope and where
the Commission focuses its measures are the number of precautionary measures issued by country. Which countries receive the
most precautionary measures? In the last decade, Colombia had
the most with 173 measures. Then comes Guatemala, with 97
measures, then Mexico with 75, and—I would say surprisingly
for some and not for others—the United States is fourth, with 72
precautionary measures. As you can imagine, these entail issues
of non-refoulement and issues related to the death penalty.

Behind each one of these situations, there are grim realities
that stem from armed conflict, discrimination, poverty, corruption,
precarious prison conditions, and impunity, which unfortunately
still exist in the Americas. On this basis, with a colleague in the
University of Ghent in Belgium, we studied all of the measures
that have been adopted by the Inter-American Commission since
they first adopted this power in the regulations in the 1980s; we
ended up with a collection of 771 precautionary measures. Then
we studied how the Commission dealt with petitions regarding
different countries—the Americas is composed of a very diverse
set of countries, some of which have gross, systematic violations
of human rights, others with established democracies—to understand the scope of application of the precautionary measures of
the Commission and how they have been used in its history.

There is very little information about the implementation of
the measures. We only found some references, particularly dealing with the death penalty. Of the death penalty cases, there were
only a few reported—139 cases reported on the death penalty,
and only 45 of those cases were followed up in these reports.
And of those 45 death penalty cases, there was some sort of
compliance with the measures only in half of them. The [United
States] complied with seven cases with interim measures of the
Commission. Other countries have complied with precautionary measures—half of them have been complied with in some
way or another, partly on the basis of the report regarding death
penalty cases.

We intend to release this article in two or three months, and
hopefully it will increase understanding of the Commission’s
measures, as opposed to the practice of the provisional measures
of the Court, given that there is much more information on these.
The Commission can issue measures regarding any right recognized by the Inter-American instruments for which the individual
complaint procedure is available, that is the basic prerequisite.
This very broad subject matter jurisdiction is, however, limited
by notions that were mentioned before—gravity, urgency and
irreparability of a particular situation, and on those bases it has
narrowed its measures to specific situations and specific rights.

The Value of Precautionary Measures
Finally, I would like to highlight a couple more issues. First is
the importance of precautionary measures for the protection of
the most basic rights. The Commission has been very deliberate
in opening its measures not only for situations that have been
dealt with in cases, as I mentioned, but beyond that. You can
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bring a petition for precautionary measures to the Commission
even before you have filed the case in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. This is a very broad interpretation
of its implied powers. States have not opposed this interpretation, so there is a consistent practice. Opposition comes from,
for example, the United States under the American Declaration,
stating that there is no jurisdiction of the Commission on that
softer regime. The United States has not ratified the American
Convention. However, the practice of issuing protective measures
beyond the existence of a case, is a very well-settled practice.

there is an intrinsic relationship between international regimes
and the publicity, the mobilization of information in order to
signal: “Where do we have problems, in which countries?”
The oral proceedings were happening in the Commission since
the creation of the mechanism, but were strengthened with the
creation of the Inter-American Court proceedings. So, once the
Court was in place in 1980, the Commission and the new regulations allowed for more liberal use of oral proceedings in individual cases. The Commission had been holding hearings here
in Washington, D.C., two times a year, and as soon as Internet
was available, these new technologies allowed for the more efficient dissemination of information, including webcasting of the
hearings through the Internet. This included not only cases and
hearings in individual cases, but also in precautionary measures.
So, there are several cases in which precautionary measures have
been dealt with in the public scene using these technologies.

I submit to you, and I think it is something that we could
eventually discuss, that if we think about the object and purpose
of a convention such as the American Convention, the traditional
notion of interim measures being linked to the existence of a case
may be appropriate in situations where there are two countries
involved in inter-state litigation before the International Court of
Justice. But, when you are talking about these public regimes, in
which you are protecting human rights, the object and purpose
is prevention which governs the interpretation of the powers of
the organs that supervise implementation. And in that sense, it
would be quite narrow to apply these measures, in the case of the
Inter-American System, only when there is a case already filed.
There are some dilemmas that, I think, have been solved in the
case of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and,
that having a viable case in terms of the American Convention
would not be an adequate interpretation of the need to have quick
action. I think it is an important reference regarding provisional
measures in the [Committee against Torture] and the possibility
of improving how you read the Convention, and how to re-craft
the rules of procedure.

On the other hand there is enforcement. Once the public is
aware and sees the government and the parties talking about the
situation that is probably occurring in real time, you may have a
good possibility of preventing torture or arbitrary execution. I do
accept that there are other situations in which you have to be very
careful when you are using publicity because you could create
problems, but again, you assess in which situations this can be
useful and in which situations it should not be done. The Commission can refrain from publishing certain names to avoid this
problem. This publicity is very important for enforcement and in
the case of precautionary measures and provisional measures, it
induces certain pressure on states to prevent irreparable damage.

Case Study: Guantanamo Bay
The last thing I want to comment on is one interesting example of how the Commission works and the possibility of the
use of the mechanisms of the Commission and the famous Guantanamo measures of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights. The United States has not ratified the American Convention, so it was only [subject] to the Commission’s procedures and
interim measures—the Court was not available. These measures
were adopted only a few months after September 11, 2001—less
than a year. In March 2002, the first measures were issued by the
Inter-American Commission, when information began to trickle
in that there could be violations occurring in Guantanamo and
elsewhere, and that people could be tortured. The Commission
began to issue interim measures; there was no case then, only
interim measures. It began to document and put pressure on the
United States as the only mechanism available for individual
complaints regarding this country.

The Commission’s Responses and Enforcement
From the perspective of the Inter-American Human Rights
System, I can mention that prevention is a real-time exercise.
In that sense, when someone is in danger of being tortured, how
can you interpret your normative framework in order to be able
to react in those situations to say, “I am a human rights body,
I have to develop tools that would allow me to prevent torture
in real time, one of the most dramatic situations that you can
have in the violation of human rights”? In that sense, I think the
[Inter-American] Commission [on Human Rights] has been very
strategic in the use of press releases. The Inter-American Commission indeed has used its press release capabilities when there
are certain situations. For example, on September 26, 2012, the
Commission issued a press release concerning the acts of violence in a prison of the United States. It basically reacted to what
was happening in real time, using this press release, not necessarily precautionary measures, but again with careful wording
indicating the Commission is worried about what is happening
in those particular settings.

The Commission began to expand, modify, and amplify these
measures throughout the years—2004, 2005, 2007, etc. The
latest developments are very interesting because now some of
the petitioners—the Center for Constitutional Rights and CEJIL
(Center for Justice and International Law) here in Washington—have requested that the Commission begin to implement
public hearings on the situation in Guantanamo, and to hold
public hearings that are streamed through the Internet, and to

One of the aspects of the latest developments that I think is
very important in the practice of the Commission is oral proceedings. Oral proceedings have been crucial and if we step back
and think about the enforcement of human rights law, I believe
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mobilize public information. So, this is something that shows
that these petitioners that are using the individual complaint
procedure, using the interim measures, using the cases that have
been filed subsequently, now are resorting to the political
diplomatic powers of the Commission seeking a thematic hearing
from the Commission regarding the situation of human rights
in Guantanamo and elsewhere.

For those that are interested, you can look for this information
on CEJIL’s website,24 among others, and see the latest developments, how it advocates, and how petitioners are using all of
the tools at their disposal to induce pressure in a specific situation. The Guantanamo measures, I think, are a very interesting
example in this regard.
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